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Single-photon-detection attack on the phase coding continuous variable quantum
cryptography
Shi-Hai Sun, Mu-Sheng Jiang, Lin-Mei Liang∗
Department of Physics, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, P.R.China
The phase coding quantum cryptographic scheme using the homodyne detection and weak co-
herent state [Hirano et al 2003 Phys.Rev.A 68 042331] provides the simplest continuous variable
quantum key distribution scheme from the experimental side. However, the inherent loss of practical
system will not only increase the bit error rate (BER) but also affect the security of final key. In
this paper, we propose a single-photon-detection attack, then the security of final key will be com-
promised in some parameter regimes. Our results show that the BER induced by Eve can be lower
than the inherent BER induced by the loss of system in some parameter regimes. Furthermore, our
attack gives the maximal communication distance of this scheme for given experimental parameters.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) admits two remote
parties, known as Alice (the sender) and Bob (the re-
ceiver), to share secret key. The unconditional security of
the key is guaranteed by the quantum mechanics, and any
eavesdropper (Eve) in the quantum channel can be dis-
covered by the legitimate parties. In the past years, the
single-photon-based discrete variable QKD (DV-QKD),
for example, the BB84 protocol [1], has been studied
widely. The unconditional security of such scheme has
been proved in theory for both the ideal system [2, 3]
and the practical system [4, 5]. It has also been demon-
strated with high repetition rate and long distance [6–9].
Furthermore, there exists commercial products based on
the DV-QKD [10]. Although the DV-QKD has been well
developed, it faces some inherent challenges within cur-
rent technology, for example, the single photon source is
not available nowadays and the efficiency of single pho-
ton detector is very low (about 20%). As an alterna-
tive scheme for the DV-QKD, the continuous variable
QKD (CV-QKD) is proposed [11–14] and demonstrated
[13, 15–17]. Compared with the DV-QKD, the CV-QKD
has two important advantages: one is that it uses the
coherent state, instead of the single photon source, to
encode the information, which can be obtained by us-
ing a commercial laser diode; the other one is that the
homodyne detector used in the CV-QKD has very high
efficiency (about 90%).
In the CV-QKD, one interesting scheme is the appli-
cation of the homodyne detection on the phase coding
four-state protocol, which is proposed by Hirano et al.
[13]. This scheme combines the phase modulator and
the homodyne detection with a coherent pulse, thus it
provides the simplest CV-QKD schemes from the experi-
mental side. Although this scheme is secure for the ideal
system [14], there exists inherent loss in the practical
∗Email:nmliang@nudt.edu.cn
system (including the loss of channel and Bob’s optical
setups, and the imperfect efficiency of homodyne detec-
tor), which will not only raise the inherent bit error rate
(BER) of system but also compromise the security of fi-
nal key.
In this paper, we propose a single-photon-detection at-
tack strategy to compromise, in some parameter regimes,
the security of quantum cryptographic scheme using
pulsed homodyne detection and weak coherent pulses
[13]. Our results show that the BER induced by our
attack can be lower than the inherent BER of practical
system in some parameter regime. Therefore, when our
attack is taken into account, the secret key will be com-
promised. Furthermore, our results also give the maximal
communication distance for given experimental parame-
ters.
The paper is organized as following: In Sec.II, we re-
view the quantum cryptographic scheme and then derive
the bit error rate (BER) of Bob in the absence of Eve. In
Sec.III, we introduce Eve’s strategy and derive the BER
induced by Eve. In Sec.IV, we first discuss one coun-
termeasure to beat Eve’s strategy. Then we discuss one
open question. Finally, we give a brief summary of this
paper in Sec.V
II. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH
PULSED HOMODYNE DETECTION
In this section, we first review the quantum crypto-
graphic scheme. Then we derive the BER of Bob in the
absence of Eve.
The protocol runs as follows [13, 14]. Alice randomly
sends one of the four coherent states {|αeikπ/2〉} to Bob,
here k = 0, 1, 2, 3 and α is positive real number. The
coherent state is the eigenstate of the annihilation oper-
ator â of the light field. Then Bob randomly measures
one of the two quadratures {x̂1, x̂2}. Here, x̂1 + ix̂2 = â,
thus [x̂1, x̂2] = i/2. After the communication, Alice an-
nounces the basis used by her, when Bob uses the correct-
basis, they keep the pulse, otherwise, they discard the
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The simple diagram of quantum cryp-
tosystem with pulsed homodyne detector [13] and Eve’s ex-
perimental arrangement. LD: laser diode; BS: 50/50 beam
splitter; PBS: polarization beam splitter; Att.: attenuator;
PM: phase modulator; QC: quantum channel; PC: polariza-
tion controller; Dc and Dd: photodiode; C1 and C2: compara-
tor; D1 and D2: single photon detectors (SPD). x+ and x−
are two threshold values set by Bob to judge the bit value of
Alice. Generally speaking, he can set x+ = −x− = x0. s and
l represent the signal pulse and local pulse respectively. Gen-
erally speaking, the intensity of local pulse will be larger than
that of signal pulse, thus Att.2 is used by Eve to attenuate
the intensity of local pulse to maximize the visibility of in-
terference. Part(a) shows the general cryptosystem. Part(b)
shows Eve’s experimental arrangement. Eve intercepts the
pulse from Alice and sends a faked pulse to Bob according to
her measurement results.
pulse. Here we say a pulse is correct-basis means that
Bob measures x̂1 when Alice sends | ± α〉 and Bob mea-
sures x̂2 when Alice sends |±iα〉. For all the correct-basis
pulses, Bob sets two threshold values x+ > 0 and x− < 0
to judge the bit value of Alice. In the symmetric case,
he can set x+ = −x− = x0. We assume Alice regards
{|α〉, |iα〉} as bit 0 and {| − α〉, | − iα〉} as bit 1. Thus
Bob’s bit value is determined by
(bit value) =


0 if x > x0
1 if x < −x0
inconclusive otherwise,
(1)
where x is the measurement result of Bob’s homodyne
detection.
The simple diagram of the experimental arrangement
is shown in Fig.1(Part(a)). The pulse from Alice’s laser
is divided into two parties, one is the signal pulse (s)
and the other one is the local pulse (l). Then Alice ran-
domly and equally modulates one of four phase values
{0, π/2, π, 3π/2} on the signal pulse with a phase modu-
lator (PM). In order to ensure the security of key, Alice
attenuates s to a suitable level (about 1 photon/pulse).
Note that, the intensity of l is very large (about 106 pho-
ton/pulse). When s and l arrive at Bob’s zone, Bob mea-
sures x̂1 or x̂2 by randomly and equally modulating one
of two phase values {0, π/2} on the local pulse. Then
the pulse will be detected by two photodiode (Dc and
Dd). Finally, Bob uses two comparators to record the
bit value. In the following, we analyze the BER in the
absence of Eve. Without loss of generality, we assume
Alice sends | ± α〉 and Bob measures x̂1. Thus the state
received by Bob is given by
ρ1 =
1
2
(|√ηµa〉〈√ηµa|+ | − √ηµa〉〈−√ηµa|), (2)
where µa = |α|2 is the intensity of signal state. η =
ηcηbob, here ηc is the transmittance of channel, ηbob is the
transmittance of Bob’s optical setups and the efficiency
of homodyne detection. According to the measurement
theory, the probability that the outcome xφb is obtained
by measuring x̂φb = x̂1 cosφb + x̂2 sinφb of a coherent
state |βeiφa〉 is given by [14]
|〈xφb |βeiφa〉|2 =
√
2
π
exp[−2(xφb − β cosφ)2], (3)
where φ = φb−φa. Thus the probability that Bob obtains
a conclusive result is given by
P absencepost
=
∫ −x0
−∞
dx1〈x1|ρ1|x1〉+
∫ ∞
x0
dx1〈x1|ρ1|x1〉
=
1
2
{erfc[
√
2(x0 +
√
ηµa)] + erfc[
√
2(x0 −√ηµa)]},
(4)
where erfc(x) is the error function which is given by
erfc(x) =
2√
π
∫ ∞
x
e−t
2
dt. (5)
Therefore, the inherent BER of Bob in the absence of
Eve can be written as
Eabsencebob
=
1
2P absencepost
[
∫ −x0
−∞
|〈x1|√ηµa〉|2dx1 +
∫ ∞
x0
|〈x1| − √ηµa〉|2dx1]
=
1
2P absencepost
erfc[
√
2(x0 +
√
ηµa)].
(6)
Eq.6 shows clearly that the inherent BER of system is
determined by x0, µa and η. Although Alice can choose
x0 and µa carefully to ensure that the system provides
higher security, the loss of channel and homodyne detec-
tion is unavoidable. The BER for different communica-
tion distance is shown in Fig.2. It shows clearly that the
loss of channel raise the inherent BER of system quickly.
Therefore, it may give some space to hide the existence of
Eve. In fact, in next section, we will show that Eve can
break the security of system in some parameter regime.
III. SINGLE-PHOTON-DETECTION ATTACK
WITH SPD
In this section, we first introduce Eve’s attack strategy.
Then we analyze the error rate induced by Eve’s attack.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The bit error rate of Bob changes
with the threshold value set by Bob. The dashed lines are
the BER in the absence of Eve for different communication
distance. The solid lines are the BER in the presence of Eve.
µe is the intensity of pulse sent by Eve. l is the distance of
channel whose unit is km. We assume the channel between
Alice and Bob is fiber, thus ηc = 10
−al/10 (a = 0.21dB/km
is the typical loss of fiber). In the simulations, we set ηbob =
0.6636 according to the experimental result of Ref.[13]. At
the same time, we assume the SPD of Eve is perfect, which
means Y0 = 0 and ǫ = 1.
The experimental arrangement of Eve is shown in Fig.1
(Part(b)). Eve first intercepts the pulse from Alice, then
she randomly and equally modulates the local pulse with
one of two phase (0 and π/2). Then local pulse and
signal pulse will interfere at the BS and detected by two
single photon detectors (SPDs). Note that the intensity
of local pulse is much larger than that of signal pulse,
thus Eve should attenuate the intensity of local pulse to
maximize the visibility of interference. If Eve obtains a
valid result, she resends a faked state to Bob according
to her measurement result, for example, if Eve modulates
0, she resends |α〉 (or | − α〉) to Bob when D1 (or D2)
clicks, if Eve modulates π/2, she resends |iα〉 (or | − iα〉)
to Bob when D1 (or D2) clicks. Here valid result means
that only one SPD clicks. If both of D1 and D2 click
or neither of them click, Eve resends a vacuum state to
Bob.
Obviously, Eve will introduce additional BER. How-
ever, we will show that, the BER introduced by Eve can
be smaller than the BER introduced by the loss of prac-
tical cryptosystem in some parameter regime. Now, we
analyze the BER introduced by Eve. Without loss of
generality, we assume Alice sends |α〉 and Bob measures
x̂1. When Eve modulates the local pulse with a phase 0,
the probabilities that D1 and D2 click are given by
PD1 = 1− (1− Y0)e−2ǫµa
PD2 = Y0,
(7)
where we assume the interference of Eve is perfect. Y0 is
the dark count of Eve’s SPD, ǫ is the efficiency of Eve’s
SPD. Thus, the probabilities that Eve resends |α〉 and
| − α〉 are given by
P co0 = PD1(1− PD2)/2
P co1 = (1− PD1)PD2/2,
(8)
where the right side of the equation is divided by 2 since
the probability that Eve modulates 0 is 1/2. At the same
time, Eve may modulate the local pulse with a phase π/2,
then the probabilities that D1 and D2 click are given by
P ′D1 = P
′
D2 = 1− (1− Y0)e−ǫµa ≡ P ′D. (9)
Thus, the probabilities that Eve resends |iα〉 and | − iα〉
are given by
P inco0 = P
inco
1 = P
′
D(1− P ′D)/2. (10)
Furthermore, the probability that Eve resends a vacuum
state to Bob is given by
Pvac = [(1−PD1)(1−PD2)+PD1PD2+(1−P ′D)2+(P ′D)2]/2.
(11)
Obviously, Eve’s attack will disturb the original state
sent by Alice, which will be transformed as
|α〉〈α| →ρ′ = P co0 |αe〉〈αe|+ P co1 | − αe〉〈−αe|
+ P inco0 |iαe〉〈iαe|+ P inco1 | − iαe〉〈−iαe|
+ Pvac|0〉〈0|,
(12)
where |αe|2 is the intensity of pulse sent by Eve. As a
result, the probability that Bob obtains conclusive result
in the presence of Eve is given by
P presencepost
=
∫ −x0
−∞
dx1〈x1|ρ′|x1〉+
∫ ∞
x0
dx1〈x1|ρ′|x1〉
=
1
2
(P co0 + P
co
1 ){erfc[
√
2(x0 +
√
µe)] + erfc[
√
2(x0 −√µe)]}
+ (P inco0 + P
inco
1 + Pvac)erfc(
√
2x0),
(13)
where we set µe = ηbob|αe|2, since Eve can send a strong
pulse to compensate the loss of Bob’s optical setups and
the efficiency of homodyne detector. And the BER in the
presence of Eve can be written as
Epresencebob
=
1
P presencepost
∫ −x0
−∞
dx1〈x1|ρ′|x1〉
=
1
2P presencepost
{P co0 erfc[
√
2(x0 +
√
µe)]
+ P co1 erfc[
√
2(x0 −√µe)]
+ (P inco0 + P
inco
1 + Pvac)erfc(
√
2x0)}.
(14)
The BER in the presence of Eve is shown in Fig.2.
It shows clearly that the BER induced by Eve can be
4lower than the BER induced by the loss of system in
some parameter regime. For example, when µa = 1
and l = 30km, Epresencebob is smaller than E
absence
bob for
the threshold value that x0 > 1.12. Thus, in these pa-
rameters regime, the loss of system will leave some space
for Eve to spy the secret key and the security of final
key will be compromised. In other words, the legitimate
parties must set their experimental parameters carefully
to remove the existence of Eve.
Here we remark that Fig.2 gives the maximal thresh-
old value that can be set by Bob for a given communi-
cation distance, then it gives the minimal inherent BER
of system. For example, when l = 30km, the maximal
threshold value is 1.12 and 1.47 for µa = 1 and µa = 1.5
respectively, which corresponds to the minimal inherent
BER 1.65% and 0.19% respectively. Furthermore, the
simulations show that when l = 50km, Epresencebob is al-
ways smaller than Eabsencebob , even Bob sets x0 = 0. Thus
our attack also gives the maximal communication dis-
tance of the cryptographic scheme for given experimental
parameters.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Countermeasure
In Sec.III, we have shown that the BER induced by our
attack can be lower than the BER induced by the inher-
ent loss of cryptosystem in some parameter regime. Thus
the legitimate parties must set their experimental param-
eters carefully to remove the existence of Eve. However,
these limited parameters regime will affect the perfor-
mance of the cryptosystem. In this section, we discuss
one countermeasure to show that the legitimate parties
can discover the existence of Eve by reconstructing the
probability density of each state sent by Alice.
Without loss of generality, we also assume that Alice
sends |α〉. Thus when Eve is present, the original state
will be transformed as ρ′ which is given by Eq.12. It
is easy to derive the probability density of Bob’s mea-
surement result x. When Bob uses the correct basis, the
probability density in the absence and presence of Eve
are given by
P absenceco = 〈x1|
√
ηµa〉〈√ηµa|x1〉
P presenceco = 〈x1|ρ′|x1〉,
(15)
and when Bob uses the wrong basis, the probability den-
sity are given by
P absenceinco = 〈x2|
√
ηµa〉〈√ηµa|x2〉
P presenceinco = 〈x2|ρ′|x2〉.
(16)
The probability density is shown in Fig.3. It shows
clearly that, when Eve is absent, the probability density
of x still follows the Gauss distribution, and the loss of
system only reduces the average value. But Eve’s attack
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The probability density of quadrature
x measured by Bob. The figure shows the probability density
when Alice sends |α〉, thus the correct basis means that Bob
measures x̂1 and the wrong basis means that Bob measures
x̂2. The dashed lines are drawn in the absence of Eve and
the solid lines are obtained in the presence of Eve. Here we
set µa = 1. Other parameters used in the simulations are the
same as that of Fig.2.
will change the probability density of Bob’s measurement
(see the solid lines of part(a) in Fig.3), since she may send
wrong state to Bob. Thus Bob can discover the existence
of Eve by reconstructing the probability density of his
measurement result.
Although Eve’s attack will affect the probability den-
sity of x when Bob uses the correct basis, the difference
is small when Bob uses the wrong basis (see part(b) of
Fig.3). The simulation shows that x still follows the
Gauss distribution when Bob chooses the wrong basis,
even Eve is present. Thus, from the experimental side,
it is hard to know the difference is caused by Eve or
the statistical fluctuation of the measurement result. In
other words, the legitimate parties only need to recon-
struct the probability density of x for the case that Bob
uses the correct basis, and they can discard the case that
Bob uses the wrong basis.
B. Compare with previous attack
In this paper, we propose a new method to attack
the phase coding continuous variable quantum cryptog-
raphy. According to the analysis described above, it is
known that the security of final key will be compromised
in some parameter regimes, when our attack is taken
into account. In fact, our attack can be classified as
an intercept-and-resend attack, but Eve uses SPDs to
read out Alice’s information, instead of using a homo-
dyne detection system. In order to show the advantage
of our attack, we compare our attack with the simulta-
neous measurement attack (SMA), which is analyzed by
Namiki and Hirano in the Ref.[14]. In SMA, Eve equiva-
lently splits the signal pulse into two parts with a 50:50
beam splitter, and measures x̂1 of one part and x̂2 of the
other part. Her measurement results are noted as (x1, x2)
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FIG. 4: (Color online)The error rate of Bob in the presence
of Eve. SPDA represents the single-photon-detection attack,
and SMA is the simultaneous measurement attack which is
proposed and analyzed by Namiki and Hirano in the Ref.[14].
In the simulations, we assume Eve’s detection system is per-
fect, which means that both the SPDs and homodyne detec-
tors of Eve are perfect.
for each signal pulse. Then she resends a new coherent
state to Bob according to the inequality between x1 and
x2, which is given by
|αe〉 if x1 ≥ |x2|
| − αe〉 if −x1 ≥ |x2|
|iαe〉 if x2 > |x1|
| − iαe〉 if −x2 > |x1|,
(17)
where |αe|2 is the intensity of pulse sent by Eve. There-
fore, when Eve loads th SMA, Eq.(12) will be rewritten
as [14]
|α〉〈α| →ρ′′ = P+|αe〉〈αe|+ P−| − αe〉〈−αe|
+ P⊥(|iαe〉〈iαe|+ | − iαe〉〈−iαe|), (18)
where
P+ =
∫
x1≥|x2|
Q(x1, x2)dx1dx2
P− =
∫
−x1≥|x2|
Q(x1, x2)dx1dx2
P⊥ =
∫
x2>|x1|
Q(x1, x2)dx1dx2,
(19)
and
Q(x1, x2) =
2
π
exp[−2(x1 −
√
µa/2)
2 − 2x22]. (20)
Then we can estimate the error rate of Bob in the
presence of Eve by using Eq.(13) and Eq.(14), which is
shown in Fig.4. It clearly shows that, in some parameter
regimes, the error rate of Bob in the presence of Eve
induced by our attack can be much lower than that of
SMA.
Here we give a qualitative explanation about this re-
sult. Without loss of generalization, we assume that Al-
ice sends |α〉, and both the SPDs and homodyne detector
TABLE I: The probability that Eve resends the four new co-
herent states and vacuum state to Bob for our attack and
SMA respectively. Here we assume that Alice sends |α〉〈α|.
In the simulation, we set µa = 1 and µe = 3, and assume both
the SPD and homodyne detector of Eve are perfect.
|α〉〈α| | − α〉〈−α| |iα〉〈iα| | − iα〉〈−iα| |0〉〈0|
SPDA 0.4323 0 0.1163 0.1163 0.3351
SMA 0.7079 0.0252 0.1334 0.1334 0
of Eve are perfect. Then it is easy to check that, when
Eve chooses the same basis with Alice, she can deter-
minately obtain the correct result (|α〉) if she uses the
SPDs to measure Alice’s signal state, but she will obtain
the wrong result (| − α〉) with nonzero probability if she
uses the homodyne detector. At the same time, when
Eve chooses the incorrect basis, she will obtain |iα〉 and
| − iα〉 with equivalent probability. Of course, when Eve
uses the SPDs, she may resend the vacuum state |0〉 to
Bob since there exists empty pulses in coherent states.
Table I shows the typical probability that Eve resends
the four new coherent states and the vacuum state to Bob
for our attack and SMA respectively. Therefore, in view
of Bob (note that Bob will use the homodyne detector
to measure the signal state from Alice), the probability
that he obtains the result x is given by
P (x) =
√
2/π{Pα exp[−2(x− αe)2]
+ P−α exp[−2(x+ αe)2] + P0 exp[−2x2]},
(21)
where P±αis the probability that Eve sends |±α〉 to Bob.
P0 is the total probability that Eve sends | ± iα〉 and |0〉
to Bob. Thus Pα = P
co
0 , P−α = P
co
1 = 0, P0 = P
inco
0 +
P inco1 + Pvac for our attack, and Pα = P+, P−α = P−,
P0 = 2P⊥ for SMA. Note that the first term of Eq.(21)
is the correct term which corresponds to the case that
Eve sends the correct coherent state |α〉 to Bob, but the
second and third term are incorrect terms. However, the
third term is a gauss distribution with a center value
of 0, and will decrease quickly with the x. Thus when
the threshold value (x0) set by Bob is large enough, the
equivalent state received by Bob for our attack and SMA
can be written as
ρ′ → |αe〉〈αe|
ρ′′ → Pα|αe〉〈αe|+ P−α| − αe〉〈−αe|. (22)
Here the equivalent state means that it has the same
probability distribution as Eq.(21). Therefore, our attack
can perform better than SMA when the threshold value
(x0) set by Bob is larger than a given value. However,
note that the probability P0 of our attack is larger than
that of SMA, thus when x0 is small, SMA will perform
better than our attack, since the third term can not be
ignored at this time.
6C. Open question
In this paper, we show that Eve can use the SPD to
spy the secret key, then the security of quantum cryp-
tographic scheme using homodyne detection and weak
coherent state will be compromised in some parameter
regimes. But the legitimate parties can discover the ex-
istence of Eve by reconstructing the probability density
of state sent by Alice. In fact, this work is a consecutive
work of our previous work [18], in which we proposed a
partially random phase (PRP) attack and show that the
homodyne detection can by used to break the security
of BB84 protocol based on SPD if the phase of source is
just partially randomized. But the PRP attack can be
beaten by the decoy state method [19–22], which can be
considered as that the legitimate parties reconstruct the
character of channel (for example, the yield and error rate
of each n-photon pulse). Furthermore, note that, in the
practical QKD system, the legitimate parties may just
use part of the dimension of the photon pulse sent by Al-
ice, thus other dimensions of the photon pulse may leave
some loopholes for Eve to spy the secret key. For exam-
ple, in the phase coding QKD system, only phase dimen-
sion is used, but the photon number dimension of each
pulse is not used which will cause the photon-number-
splitting (PNS) attack [23, 24]. But the PNS attack can
be beaten by reconstructing the character of channel with
the decoy state method. All of these attacks may imply
that, if the legitimate parties reconstruct the character
of photon pulse in the practical QKD system, they can
beat Eve’s attack strategy based on the imperfection of
photon pulse used by them.
V. SUMMARY
The phase coding quantum cryptographic scheme
based on the pulsed homodyne detection and weak co-
herent state [13] provides the simplest CV-QKD schemes
from the experimental side, since only the phase modula-
tor and homodyne detector are needed. However, there
exists inherent loss in the practical system (including the
loss of channel and Bob’s optical setups, and the imper-
fect efficiency of homodyne detector), which will not only
raise the inherent BER of system but also compromise
the security of final key in some parameter regime.
In this paper, we propose an attack to compromise, in
some parameter regimes, the security of final key gen-
erated by this scheme. Our results show that the BER
induced by Eve can be lower than the BER induced by
the loss of system in some parameter regime. Thus, when
our attack is taken into account, the security of final key
will be compromised. Furthermore, our attack limits the
maximal threshold value that can be set by Bob for given
communication distance, thus it also give the minimal
inherent BER of system. Note that, for a given commu-
nication distance, if the BER induced by Eve is always
lower than the inherent BER induced by loss of system,
no secret key can be generated in this distance. In other
words, our attack also give the maximal communication
distance of this scheme for given experimental parame-
ters.
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